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Abstract
We investigate the “compass rose” (Crack, T.F. and Ledoit, O. (1996),
Journal of Finance, 51(2), pg. 751-762) patterns revealed in phase por-
traits (delay plots) of stock returns. The structures observed in these
diagrams have been attributed mainly to price clustering and discreteness.
Using wavelet based denoising, we examine the noise-free versions of a set
of FTSE100 stock returns time series. We reveal evidence of non-periodic
cyclical dynamics. As a second stage we apply Surrogate Data Analy-
sis on the original and denoised stock returns. Our results suggest that
there is a strong nonlinear and possibly deterministic signature in the data
generating processes of the stock returns sequences.
1 Introduction
The empirical investigation of the dynamics of stock returns has been an area of
intensive research since the beginning of last century (see thesis of Bachelier (1)).
The understanding of dynamics observed in price fluctuations are of paramount
importance to activities such as forecasting for investment decision support, risk
modelling and derivative pricing. Moreover, the complexity of their structure,
as a result of agent-market interactions, is an indicator of the nature of overall
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market conditions and organization. This complexity may also reflect the level of
agent’s rationality and risk tolerance. It becomes apparent that the explanation
of certain qualities of the structure of market dynamics, provides the opportunity
to improve the understanding of their current and future states. Clearly such an
exercise is of great importance to all market participants that aim to minimize
their risks and protect their investments and profits.
Viewing economies and markets in particular as a dynamical system, we can
draw many inferences by examining their observable outputs: sequences of stock
prices and the corresponding returns. Crack and Ledoit (2) have first revealed
a “compass rose” pattern discovered in scatter diagrams of returns against their
lagged values (i.e., phase portraits), such as the one depicted in Fig. 1(a). They
attributed the pattern to price clustering and discreteness and especially the tick
size and suggested reasons for its appearance.1 Our aim is by using an approach
consistent with the tradition of econophysics, to continue their research by re-
vealing yet more interesting patterns and showing that the compass rose is a
mask for more subtle dynamics. In this paper we establish the case of existence
of nonstochastic nonlinear dynamics via the calculation of the BDS statistic (8).
We use this as a discriminating statistic for a permutation test based framework
(“Surrogate Data Analysis” (SDA) by (9)) that allows us to support our results at
various levels of significance. As a second step, following (10; 11; 12), we reduce
the level of noise in the original returns sequences using Wavelet based threshold-
ing (the Waveshrink technique by (13)). We then recalculate the BDS statistic
on the denoised sequences and their surrogates and test again for the absence
of linear dynamics. Meanwhile we produce the compass rose of the denoised se-
quences only to reveal an entirely different structure that is strongly reminiscent
of a dynamical attractor. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
the returns sequence dynamics may be characterized by nonlinearities that can
be of a complex-deterministic character. The results produced here may bring
us closer to establishing that a significant part of the driving force generating
financial prices could indeed be chaotic.
[ Insert figure 1 about here. ]
1Clustering in stock market prices has been an issue that concerned research since the 1960’s
(e.g., see refs. (3; 4) who were motivated by the original findings of (5)). Ref. (6) investigated
dependencies related to clustering and discreteness. This research was followed by (7) who
conducted simulations on price rounding and discreteness and showed that the hypothesis of a
geometric Brownian motion for daily and weekly frequencies could be rejected. In general, price
clustering and discreteness is an important chapter of “market’s microstructure” with serious
implications on risk evaluation, the optimal design of securities and market efficiency.
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2 Investigating the Compass Rose
Crack and Ledoit (2) suggested first the use of phase portraits in order to re-
veal the compass rose. This implied the investigation of some sort of time-
dependency among stock return sequences. This could be linear or nonlinear,
a result of stochastic (random) or nonstochastic (deterministic) data generating
process (DGP), or even a mixture of the above behind the asset price dynamics.
The authors also proposed that the formations revealed could be of use for cal-
ibrating tests of the existence of chaos in returns sequences. Since then various
papers have appeared on this theme (see (14; 15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 20; 21)). We
believe that two issues can be addressed further:
1. As (22) note, observed stock prices are not always the true equilibrium
prices and hence the image of market dynamics observed through them
could be partial. Moreover, in markets where significant fixing takes place,
there is a variable amount of error introduced into the price level which is
then passed to the returns ((see 23, for a discussion on this)).
2. Generating logarithmic or percentage returns, i.e., 1st order differencing,
is a high-pass filter (24). In this respect, all return sequences will contain
amplified noise. Consequently, any interesting and possibly non-stochastic
structures may be concealed and/or distorted. The importance of this be-
comes even greater if we take into account point (1) above.
In the following pages, we investigate further the issue of compass rose for-
mations in stocks from the UK market. We analyze the daily closing prices of
stocks in the FTSE ALL SHARE and especially the FTSE 100 index, spanning
the period 01/01/1970 to 5/30/2003 (a maximum of 8717 observations). A total
of 53 FTSE100 stocks were available with a full (homogeneous) range of prices
for the above time-span. Remarkably, all 53 high-capitalization company prices
and corresponding returns revealed the patterns we observe and report in this
paper (some more intensively and clearly than others).2
3 Surrogate Data Analysis and Waveshrink
Following (9; 25) (see also (26; 27)), we investigated the possibility of the observed
structures of the compass rose being a “one-off” situation. The basic purpose of
the SDA procedure is to provide a framework that will allow us to deny the null
hypothesis that the data are generated by a linear stochastic system. It basically
comprises of two steps (see (28; 27) for an extensive overview):
2Although (2) use percentage returns, we concentrate on continuously compounding return
sequences (logarithmic returns) and observe the same patterns.
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• The production of data sets from a model which captures deliberately only
certain “linear” properties of the original sequence. These sets are called
“surrogate data”.
• The rejection of the null hypothesis H0 according to a calculation of a dis-
criminating statistic. This will suggest that the original data is very unlikely
to have been generated by a process consistent with the null hypothesis.
If the value of the statistic calculated on the original data set is different from the
sets of values obtained on the surrogate data, we have a clear indication for the
rejection of the null. There are various different nulls, some more composite than
others and each null is usually accompanied by its own procedure of surrogate
data generation. For the purposes of this paper we followed Refs. (27; 29;
25). We thus generated phase-randomized amplitude-adjusted surrogates (termed
“AAFT”) to test for the null hypothesis that the return sequences were monotonic
nonlinear transformation of linearly filtered noise (which is also maintained as the
“most interesting”). Such surrogates are expected to exhibit the same spectral
and distributional characteristics as in the original series, however they are purely
linear processes. As a discriminating statistic we chose the BDS test (8; 30; 31;
32).
We simulated AAFT surrogate data from the original returns sequences, and
produced the compass roses for various stocks. An example of an AAFT surrogate
set compass rose for the BP stock is presented in Fig. 3(c). We can clearly
see there that both the randomly shuffled sequence (Fig. 3(b)) and the AAFT
surrogates loose the compass rose structure whereas the bootstrapped sequence
maintains it (Fig. 3(d)).3 This was an initial indication that the results of
clustering and discreteness may not be manifestations of linear-random dynamics.
Following the results of the SDA analysis on the phase portraits, we chose
to test for independence under an SDA framework for a subset of 53 FTSE100
stocks’ returns. We used the BDS test as a discriminating statistic, and gener-
ated the AAFT surrogate sets for each stock, testing the null at 5%, 2.5% and 1%
significance levels. In tables 1 and 2, we present the results of the SDA. In table
1 we quote the results for a BDS test neighborhood size of 0.5 times the stan-
dard deviation of each returns sequence, for significance levels α = 5%, 2.5% and
1%. The results here refute clearly the null that the sequences are a monotonic
nonlinear transformation of linearly filtered white noise. This is a strong indi-
cation of absence of linear dynamics and randomness and supports the premise
of nonlinear deterministic complexity in the returns. The results of table 2 are
also supporting this finding. There we have provided more detail, checking for
neighborhood sizes of ǫ1 = 0.5× sx, ǫ2 = 1.0× sx, ǫ3 = 1.5× sx and ǫ4 = 2.0× sx,
where s
x
denotes the standard deviation of each returns sequence. The level of
3For a discussion on the differences of bootstrapping and surrogate data analysis refer to
(33).
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significance for table 2 is α = 5%. The results clearly show that the above null
is strongly refuted.
[ Insert Table 1 about here. ]
[ Insert Table 2 about here. ]
[ Insert Table 3 about here. ]
Since the results of SDA where pointing towards more complex, nonlinear
dynamics (possibly deterministic) we tested as a next step, the returns sequences
after these have been filtered for noise reduction. For each stock returns se-
quence we produced a filtered version, using the Waveshrink (13) approach. We
then produced AAFT surrogates and tested for α = 2.5% significance level. In
table 3 we produce the results for the BP stock, where the Waveshrink (34; 13)
routine has been applied for a Daubechies 8 (D8) wavelet.4. Wavelets here are a
justified choice in order to avoid the “bleaching” of the returns sequences (35),
and preserve any delicate deterministic structures in the DGPs. Our approach
is also consistent with Refs. (36; 37; 38). Looking at the values of the BDS
statistic for the original prefiltered sequence and its AAFT surrogates, as well as
the p-value of the statistic for sizes of neighborhood ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 times
the standard deviation, we can safely reject the null at a 5% significance level.
Only for a size of neighborhood of 2× standard deviation ǫ4 = 0.0035 (which is a
considerable size), we can reject the null at a level of significance of almost 70%.
Searching for qualitative evidence of deterministic dynamics and aperiodic
cycles we looked at the phase portraits of the denoised sequences. For example,
in Fig. 1 (b) we can clearly see the phase portrait for the BP denoised returns
reveals dynamics that are similar to chaotic attractors. A detail of the core of
the phase portrait in Fig. 1 (c) exhibits dynamics that are very similar to that
of the Mackey-Glass attractor (39) in Fig. 1 (d). This appears to be in line with
(40; 41).
[ Insert figure 2 about here. ]
4Choices of different mother wavelets produced similar results. See also Ref. (11)
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[ Insert figure 3 about here. ]
Another interesting diagram that reveals the effects of stock price clustering
and discreteness is depicted in Fig. 2 (a). There we have plotted the prices
of BP stock against the corresponding logarithmic returns. We can clearly see
patterns of correlation and anticorrelation in the same diagram. This is the first
time such patterns have been revealed in financial literature and they need to be
investigated further. In nonlinear science, the phase portraits (i.e., the compass
rose) are usually called “delay plots” whereas the plot of a sequence of prices from
a function gainst its first derivative are called “phase plots”. Thus the diagram
in Fig. 2 (a) could be loosely termed as a phase plot. If we generate the same
kind of display for the denoised sequences (in this case for the BP stock), we see
clearly the cyclical but aperiodic behavior observed in the phase portraits also
repeated here (Fig. 2 (b)).
The results lead us to deduce that the presence of chaotic dynamics can not
be excluded. Such a statement though should also involve the calculation of
certain invariant measures that characterize chaos (such as entropy or dimension
based statistics). Moreover, these results should also be backed by a suitable
SDA testing exercise. We retain this as a strategy for future research. It would
also be interesting to observe if these smoother though irregular cyclical dynamics
revealed in this paper are irrespective of the noise reduction technique (i.e., robust
under different noise reduction techniques).
4 Conclusions and future research
We have investigated the dynamics of sequences of daily closing prices and the
corresponding returns for stocks traded in the London Stock Exchange in the last
three decades, as these are observed through the compass rose phase portraits.
Our results suggest that the amount of noise inherent in the examined sequences
may be covering more “interesting” dynamics. Using wavelet based noise reduc-
tion techniques we filtered the return sequences only to uncover a strong aperiodic
nonlinear behavior, characteristic of many phenomena that are governed by com-
plex deterministic dynamics. The SDA hypothesis testing framework employed
here also suggests the absence of stochastic randomness and linear dynamics for
both original and denoised returns sequences. Our results show that the appar-
ently random dynamics and discreteness observed in closing price sequences, may
conceal via the generation of noise in the returns, a more delicate structure and
aperiodic cyclical dynamics. However, further research in needed to maintain the
hypothesis of nonlinear determinism in stock price time series dynamics.
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Table 1: Surrogate Data Analysis results on actual returns for 53 companies in the
FTSE100. Discriminating statistic: BDS test. Neighbourhood size ǫ = 0.5× s
x
,
where s
x
= standard deviation of x. Biases and standard errors (s.e.) reported
for significance levels α = 5%, 2.5% and 1%.
α = 5% α = 2.5% α = 1%
BDS Statistic bias s.e. bias s.e. bias s.e.
FTSE ALL SHARE - PRICE INDEX 27.11 −25.29 1.01 −25.38 1.14 −25.13 1.05
FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX 31.9 −31.61 1.24 −31.41 1.05 −31.82 0.91
ALLIED DOMECQ 18.68 −18.64 1.08 −18.83 1.1 −18.65 0.94
AMVESCAP 32.51 −32.38 0.7 −31.86 0.98 −32.25 0.90
ASSD.BRIT.FOODS 28.44 −28.44 0.96 −28.26 1.01 −28.35 0.90
AVIVA 22.57 −22.18 0.98 −22.43 1.06 −22.45 1.03
BARCLAYS 23.1 −22.29 1.06 −22.40 1.02 −22.45 0.98
BOC GROUP 23.19 −23.19 1.11 −23.16 1.01 −22.97 1.03
BOOTS GROUP 19.99 −19.55 1.27 −19.45 1.06 −19.46 1.04
BP 17.27 −16.95 1.13 −16.97 0.9 −17.03 1.08
BRIT.AMERICAN TOBACCO 17.76 −17.43 1.23 −17.57 1.12 −17.53 0.97
BRITISH LAND 36.57 −36.36 1.27 −36.19 0.97 −36.57 1.09
BUNZL 25.95 −24.82 0.78 −24.68 1.32 −24.95 1.17
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 24.89 −24.55 1.26 −24.44 0.93 −24.36 1.00
DAILY MAIL ’A’ 34.58 −34.10 1.19 −34.21 1.22 −34.12 1.04
DIAGEO 23.41 −23.33 1.11 −23.23 1.11 −23.31 0.99
DIXONS GP. 25.12 −24.65 0.98 −24.54 1.25 −24.72 1.09
EMAP 33.47 −32.82 0.9 −33.04 1.13 −33.04 1.01
EXEL 31.92 −30.59 1.27 −30.88 1 −30.97 1.05
FOREIGN & COLONIAL 25.76 −25.04 0.8 −25.23 1.1 −25.35 1.02
GKN 22.41 −22.37 0.89 −22.43 1.06 −22.22 1.03
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 18.48 −18.05 0.94 −18.04 1.14 −18.27 1.13
GRANADA 31.42 −30.44 1.16 −30.35 0.95 −30.42 1.11
GUS 43.46 −43.23 1.29 −43.28 0.9 −43.31 1.16
HANSON 23.26 −22.95 1.19 −22.58 1 −22.76 0.99
HILTON GROUP 22.41 −22.23 1.1 −22.15 1.05 −22.12 0.92
IMP.CHM.INDS. 21.56 −21.43 0.96 −21.50 1.04 −21.35 1.05
JOHNSON MATTHEY 28.6 −27.32 0.9 −27.76 1 −27.61 1.13
LAND SECURITIES 26.82 −26.36 0.79 −26.31 1.15 −26.33 1.05
LEGAL & GENERAL 24.83 −24.67 1.23 −24.67 1.08 −24.62 1.03
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 22.22 −22.10 1.22 −22.25 0.9 −22.26 1.06
MORRISON (WM) SPMKTS. 22.36 −21.71 1.22 −21.91 1.11 −21.86 1.08
NEXT 23.44 −23.05 1.05 −23.05 0.9 −22.85 1.06
PEARSON 29.34 −28.47 1.05 −28.56 0.78 −28.63 1.15
PROVIDENT FINL. 32.23 −31.93 1.13 −31.53 1.03 −31.45 1.04
PRUDENTIAL 23.3 −23.13 0.87 −23.12 0.95 −23.14 0.96
RECKITT BENCKISER 23.43 −22.62 1.29 −22.62 0.76 −22.45 1.00
REED ELSEVIER 24.67 −24.40 1.37 −24.29 0.93 −24.43 0.92
RENTOKIL INITIAL 29.41 −28.93 0.78 −29.09 1.07 −28.91 1.04
REXAM 26.26 −26.08 1.03 −25.63 1.1 −25.97 1.05
RIO TINTO 23.14 −22.48 0.8 −22.58 1.21 −22.52 1.15
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 27.18 −26.85 1.11 −26.83 0.92 −26.81 1.11
SAINSBURY (J) 27.13 −26.78 0.92 −26.66 1.07 −26.62 0.99
SCHRODERS 32.63 −32.39 1.17 −32.45 1.05 −32.46 0.95
SCOT. & NEWCASTLE 28.46 −27.93 1.25 −28.43 1.08 −28.27 1.05
SHELL TRANSPORT & TRDG. 24.07 −23.36 0.96 −23.69 0.86 −23.47 1.05
SMITH & NEPHEW 28.28 −28.07 0.74 −27.76 0.98 −27.78 0.91
SMITHS GROUP 25.67 −24.30 0.99 −24.00 1.14 −24.07 0.89
STD.CHARTERED 33.79 −32.78 0.71 −33.03 0.92 −32.88 1.09
TESCO 20.95 −20.58 1.12 −20.53 0.78 −20.49 0.92
TOMKINS 27.42 −27.36 0.95 −27.57 0.89 −27.42 1.05
UNILEVER (UK) 23.95 −23.70 0.81 −23.25 1.14 −23.48 1.03
WHITBREAD 22.32 −21.59 1.14 −21.64 0.82 −21.81 1.06
WOLSELEY 26.37 −25.03 1.2 −25.16 1.13 −25.50 1.00
WPP GROUP 34.11 −33.73 0.86 −33.80 0.94 −33.64 0.91
Table 2: Surrogate Data Analysis results on actual returns for 53 companies
in the FTSE100. Discriminating statistic: BDS test (embedding dimension 3).
Neighbourhood size ǫ1 = 0.5× sx, ǫ2 = 1.0× sx, ǫ3 = 1.5× sx and ǫ4 = 2.0× sx,
where s
x
= standard deviation of x. Biases and standard errors reported for
significance level α = 1% .
Statistic (BDS) Bias Standard Error
Neighbourhood size ǫ1 ǫ2 ǫ3 ǫ4 ǫ1 ǫ2 ǫ3 ǫ4 ǫ1 ǫ2 ǫ3 ǫ4
FTSE ALL SHARE - PRICE INDEX 20.8 23.87 26.81 28.72 −18.61 −21.45 −24.32 −26.37 1.11 1.13 1.17 1.23
FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX 21.25 15.31 15.27 13.02 −21.41 −15.44 −15.41 −13.09 1.1 0.92 0.87 0.99
ALLIED DOMECQ 13.73 15.09 16.38 17.17 −13.72 −15.01 −16.25 −16.99 1.02 0.97 0.99 1
AMVESCAP 25.6 24.1 22.33 21.13 −25.13 −23.55 −21.74 −20.52 0.95 0.89 0.91 1
ASSD.BRIT.FOODS 22.73 24.5 23.7 22.53 −22.50 −24.33 −23.49 −22.41 1.06 1 1.04 1.08
AVIVA 18.31 19.37 19.79 20.26 −18.44 −19.37 −19.75 −20.18 1.11 1.18 1.14 1.11
BARCLAYS 18.25 20.46 22.67 23.97 −17.82 −19.74 −21.82 −23.12 1.04 1.09 1.03 0.98
BOC GROUP 18.3 17.06 16.67 16.13 −18.25 −16.93 −16.48 −16.00 0.91 1.02 1.06 1.01
BOOTS GROUP 15.77 16 17.12 18.31 −15.19 −15.32 −16.44 −17.74 1 1.01 0.99 0.99
BP 12.89 13.62 13.8 14.07 −12.68 −13.36 −13.44 −13.69 1.02 0.94 0.93 0.95
BRIT.AMERICAN TOBACCO 14.28 16.3 16.96 17.67 −14.50 −16.34 −16.91 −17.55 1.07 1.21 1.19 1.13
BRITISH LAND 28.42 29.97 30.8 32.2 −28.28 −29.80 −30.44 −31.82 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.05
BUNZL 21.76 19.84 18.87 15.15 −20.55 −18.16 −17.00 −13.30 1.03 0.9 0.99 1.19
CADBURY SCHWEPPES 20.53 22.39 23.32 23.81 −20.00 −21.82 −22.68 −23.11 0.97 1.05 1.04 1.1
DAILY MAIL ‘A’ 28.24 28.42 26.45 22.3 −27.93 −27.91 −25.90 −21.72 1.14 1.26 1.22 1.07
DIAGEO 18.05 18.36 18.96 19.04 −17.58 −17.75 −18.32 −18.45 1.18 1.15 1.17 1.12
DIXONS GP. 20.6 20.62 20.17 19.48 −19.95 −19.95 −19.59 −19.08 1.14 1.09 0.95 0.84
EMAP 27.63 22.23 19.17 17.41 −27.25 −21.93 −18.94 −17.17 1.04 1.03 1.08 1.08
EXEL 25.56 23.08 19.81 17.98 −24.13 −21.34 −18.02 −16.34 0.78 1.03 1.18 1.2
FOREIGN & COLONIAL 20.47 19.83 21.56 22.04 −19.97 −19.22 −20.87 −21.46 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
GKN 17.02 18.68 18.42 17.65 −16.55 −18.15 −17.85 −17.07 1.04 1.04 1.13 1.16
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 14.12 15.45 16.11 16.3 −13.89 −15.17 −15.77 −15.95 0.89 0.89 0.82 0.93
GRANADA 24.34 26.02 24.88 22.38 −23.31 −24.73 −23.46 −21.01 1.05 1.06 1.06 0.99
GUS 29.9 25.99 24.7 22.03 −29.71 −25.71 −24.45 −21.82 1.02 1.03 0.92 0.87
HANSON 19.56 19.93 19.53 18.07 −18.57 −18.89 −18.55 −17.22 1.07 1.13 1.1 1.11
HILTON GROUP 17.77 18.17 18.48 19.22 −17.17 −17.28 −17.44 −18.27 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.03
IMP.CHM.INDS. 17.11 18.92 19.68 19.58 −17.28 −18.84 −19.45 −19.38 1.05 1.01 1.03 1.05
JOHNSON MATTHEY 22.63 21.34 20.24 17.27 −21.60 −19.93 −18.77 −15.94 1.09 1.13 1.08 0.99
LAND SECURITIES 21.54 22.95 24.18 25.44 −20.93 −22.33 −23.57 −24.93 0.9 0.9 0.87 0.92
LEGAL & GENERAL 19.17 20.94 22.65 23.96 −18.98 −20.72 −22.36 −23.57 1.13 1.08 1.04 1.07
MARKS & SPENCER GROUP 17.69 19.03 20.36 20.98 −17.93 −19.25 −20.58 −21.24 0.95 0.92 0.85 0.8
MORRISON (WM) SPMKTS. 19.14 18.52 17.87 15.61 −18.71 −17.76 −17.14 −15.00 1.16 0.93 0.94 0.97
NEXT 17.35 18.96 21.43 21.21 −16.96 −18.41 −20.83 −20.68 1 1.06 1.11 1.08
PEARSON 23.95 24.97 23.55 22.58 −22.81 −23.65 −22.22 −21.38 0.92 0.91 0.94 1.04
PROVIDENT FINL. 23.8 22.06 20.06 18.6 −23.10 −21.24 −19.10 −17.76 1.19 1.08 0.96 0.94
PRUDENTIAL 18.21 19.09 21.01 22.67 −17.52 −18.38 −20.40 −22.19 0.86 0.92 1.02 1.1
RECKITT BENCKISER 19.09 20.73 21.89 22.29 −18.03 −19.43 −20.45 −20.91 1.06 0.93 0.92 0.97
REED ELSEVIER 19.57 19.57 19.44 18.94 −19.15 −19.02 −18.87 −18.47 0.79 0.9 1.04 1.03
RENTOKIL INITIAL 23.14 21.06 21.56 20.11 −22.77 −20.42 −20.90 −19.50 0.84 0.99 1.06 1.02
REXAM 20.18 19.56 18.95 18.24 −19.89 −19.18 −18.50 −17.66 0.87 0.95 1.02 1.02
RIO TINTO 17.96 18.65 18.84 18.71 −17.02 −17.46 −17.57 −17.42 0.85 0.84 0.96 1.06
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND 21.44 21.5 22.06 21.63 −21.15 −21.16 −21.64 −21.08 1.06 1.06 1.02 0.99
SAINSBURY (J) 21.44 22.58 23.46 22.49 −21.16 −22.18 −22.85 −21.79 0.9 0.91 0.96 1.04
SCHRODERS 25.54 27.25 26.83 25.09 −25.43 −27.05 −26.39 −24.92 1.17 1 1.08 0.91
SCOT. & NEWCASTLE 21.71 21.8 22.32 22.31 −21.38 −21.37 −21.82 −21.76 0.86 0.86 0.98 1.06
SHELL TRANSPORT & TRDG. 19.4 20.45 20.78 20.38 −19.14 −20.11 −20.39 −20.00 1 1 1.17 1.24
SMITH & NEPHEW 22.05 22.23 20.99 20.91 −21.76 −21.77 −20.43 −20.34 1.12 1.11 1.03 1.06
SMITHS GROUP 20.72 20.23 19.2 18.16 −18.91 −17.98 −16.78 −15.94 1.02 1.11 1.09 1.03
STD.CHARTERED 26.61 25.67 24.1 21.95 −25.44 −24.23 −22.63 −20.53 0.97 1.14 1.17 1.21
TESCO 16.39 15.57 15.6 16.05 −16.14 −15.20 −15.06 −15.44 1 1.18 1.19 1.22
TOMKINS 21.92 14.76 15.41 13.84 −21.79 −14.55 −15.25 −13.67 1.07 0.92 1.02 0.95
UNILEVER (UK) 19.48 20.62 20.74 19.9 −18.71 −19.76 −19.96 −19.30 0.83 0.88 0.94 0.92
WHITBREAD 16.91 17.65 17.6 17.21 −16.26 −16.79 −16.73 −16.37 0.89 0.84 0.9 0.94
WOLSELEY 20.51 19.06 17.85 16.49 −19.71 −17.82 −16.45 −15.20 1.14 1.01 0.88 0.88
WPP GROUP 27.81 22.97 20.73 23.13 −27.38 −22.23 −19.98 −22.17 1.06 1.02 1.3 1.34
Table 3: Surrogate Data Analysis results on D8 pre-filtered BP returns. Dis-
criminating statistic: BDS test (embedding dimension 2). Neighbourhood size
ǫ1 = 0.5× sx, ǫ2 = 1.0× sx, ǫ3 = 1.5× sx and ǫ4 = 2.0× sx, where sx = standard
deviation of x.
Neighbourhood Size
set ǫ1 = 9e − 04 ǫ1 = 0.0017 ǫ2 = 0.0026 ǫ4 = 0.0035
1 922.89 444.06 316.55 280.90
2 837.02 417.54 300.76 266.65
3 934.51 446.17 317.84 281.37
4 933.59 446.77 318.31 281.97
5 880.90 430.70 308.58 273.29
6 936.90 446.80 318.40 281.44
7 889.16 432.69 309.08 272.54
8 928.31 444.19 316.63 279.94
9 916.11 441.64 316.03 280.41
10 881.64 431.72 308.36 273.35
11 916.71 441.76 315.27 279.04
12 932.64 446.76 318.92 282.99
13 832.50 417.22 300.04 266.62
14 932.27 446.08 318.41 282.52
15 925.76 444.06 317.08 280.87
16 941.02 447.37 318.04 279.56
17 913.54 440.37 314.19 278.49
18 888.79 433.23 309.91 274.35
19 935.24 446.81 318.27 281.28
20 831.79 416.32 299.63 265.58
21 799.68 406.98 292.95 259.33
22 832.68 416.32 298.47 264.23
23 865.91 425.52 305.02 269.74
24 884.16 432.43 310.04 275.97
25 882.36 431.60 309.22 274.49
26 872.69 427.79 306.57 271.06
27 903.62 437.21 312.30 276.44
28 943.29 449.77 320.33 284.10
29 927.47 444.60 317.18 280.81
30 897.28 435.32 310.77 274.88
31 931.34 446.29 318.95 283.01
32 892.41 434.36 311.11 276.10
33 921.26 441.78 315.33 277.76
34 882.30 432.09 309.36 274.94
35 938.17 448.33 319.22 282.41
36 935.55 447.50 318.72 282.32
37 809.99 409.72 295.84 262.73
38 919.59 442.14 315.87 279.80
39 885.79 432.02 309.67 274.05
40 877.49 430.08 308.29 273.56
Original 1793.68 567.17 337.70 273.50
Significance 23.07 11.43 3.61 0.40
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69
Figure 1: The BP stock returns compass rose (a), details of the denoised BP
returns phase portraits (b,c) and the Mackey-Glass attractor (d).
Figure 2: Phase diagrams of the original (a) and denoised (b) BP prices-returns.
Figure 3: Details of compass roses of the original (a), randomly shuffled (b),
AAFT surrogate (c) and bootstrapped (d) BP returns sequences.
